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Upholding Voter Suppression and 
Choosing Judicial Abdication in Rucho v. 
Common Cause 
FRANCES R. HILL* 
Under the Constitution, voters choose their elected offi-
cials. Partisan gerrymanders, however, enable elected offi-
cials to choose their voters and, in the process, dilute the 
votes of citizens who do not support them. From this per-
spective, partisan gerrymanders undermine the sovereignty 
of the people and, thereby, undermine the foundation of this 
democratic republic. In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Su-
preme Court declared that partisan gerrymandering raises 
a nonjusticiable political question beyond the competence of 
the federal courts. This Article asks: How did this happen? 
How could the Supreme Court abdicate its duty to protect 
the sovereignty of the people and its duty to provide access 
to justice? The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice 
John Roberts, located the issues raised in these cases not in 
the jurisprudence of voting and voting rights but in a series 
of narrow claims about the competence of federal courts to 
craft appropriate legal standards. The dissent, penned by 
Justice Elena Kagan, focused on voters, voting, and the sov-
ereignty of the people. Grounded in the constitutional values 
of a democratic republic, the dissent offered a passionate re-
pudiation of virtually every element of the majority opinion. 
 
 * Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar for the Profession at 
the University of Miami School of Law. She earned her Ph.D. at Harvard Univer-
sity in comparative politics and political theory and her J.D. at the Yale Law 
School. She has written broadly on elections and on campaign finance and testi-
fied as an expert witness several times before congressional committee hearings 
on these topics. She teaches courses in tax, business, and constitutional law. 
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Yet, in the end, it was the dissent that developed a methodol-
ogy, based on the work of the lower federal courts, for a 
workable standard for addressing the challenges that the 
majority rejected as impossible. It was the dissent that found 
a way forward based on the recognition of the modern tech-
nology of vote dilution that provides the basis for preserving 
the voters’ access to justice. Nevertheless, the crafty and at 
times disingenuous framework of the majority opinion that 
ignored voting rights and democracy prevailed. This Article 
suggests that this may well be only a temporary victory as a 
younger generation of lawyers, judges, and citizens with 
more experience with the technology of partisan gerryman-
dering will find the majority’s framework and strategy as 
implausible and unpersuasive as the dissent already did in 
Rucho. 
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In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court held that parti-
san gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question and re-
manded the two cases before the Court to the appropriate United 
States district courts “with instructions to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction.”1 The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice John Rob-
erts, located the issues raised by partisan gerrymanders not in the 
jurisprudence of voting and voting rights but in a series of narrow 
claims relating to what he portrayed as the inability of the federal 
courts to craft appropriate legal standards and remedies.2 
The dissent, written by Justice Elena Kagan, focused on voters, 
voting, and the sovereignty of the people.3 It is grounded in consti-
tutional values and the values of a democratic republic.4 It is a pas-
sionate repudiation of virtually every element of the majority’s opin-
ion.5 It excoriated the majority for what the dissent concluded was 
the majority’s failure to fulfill the duty of the federal courts to up-
hold the concept that in the United States the people are sovereign.6 
The majority found the issue of partisan gerrymandering techni-
cally beyond the capacity of the courts to craft legal standards, but 
it did not find that partisan gerrymandering posed any difficulty to 
the operation of the constitutional system.7 The majority noted that 
 
 1 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019). 
 2 Id. at 2491, 2494 (“The question here is whether there is an ‘appropriate 
role for the Federal Judiciary’ in remedying the problem of partisan gerrymander-
ing—whether such claims are claims of legal right, resolvable according to legal 
principles, or political questions that must find their resolution elsewhere.”). The 
Chief Justice was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. 
 3 Id. at 2511–13 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 4 Id. at 2512–15. 
 5 See id. at 2509–25. 
 6 See id. at 2511, 2525. 
 7 See id. at 2500, 2507 (majority opinion). 
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partisan gerrymanders had been controversial from the beginning of 
the republic.8 It concluded that the United States could continue to 
live with partisan gerrymandering.9 
The dissent focused on what it regarded as the existential threat 
that partisan gerrymandering posed to the sovereignty of the peo-
ple.10 It dismissed the majority’s complacency based on historical 
experience by analyzing the changes in partisan gerrymanders over 
time and concluded that partisan gerrymanders both diluted the vote 
of individuals and undermined the constitutional structure based on 
the sovereignty of the people.11 It pointed out to the majority that 
“[t]hese are not your grandfather’s—let alone the Framers’—gerry-
manders.”12 These were instead stratagems for enduring entrench-
ment of a particular political party in power.13 In sum, the dissent 
found that partisan gerrymanders, which were always a problem, 
had become so dangerous that the Supreme Court had a duty to craft 
a remedy.14 The dissent pointed out that the majority’s abdication of 
its constitutional duty was not only wrong, but it was also unneces-
sary.15 Accusing the majority of failing to understand the opinions 
of the lower courts, the dissent claimed that the lower courts had 
already offered a methodology allowing courts to decide cases in-
volving partisan gerrymanders.16 
Each of these opinions is complex and consequential. The ma-
jority opinion is a carefully crafted enigma that can only be de-
scribed as radical. But its radicalism was carefully concealed in what 
 
 8 Id. at 2494–96. 
 9 See id. at 2508; id. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s idea 
instead seems to be that if we have lived with partisan gerrymanders so long, we 
will survive.”). 
 10 See id. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“And gerrymanders will only get 
worse . . . . And someplace along this road, ‘we the people’ become sovereign no 
longer.”). 
 11 See id. at 2512–13. 
 12 Id. at 2513. 
 13 See id. at 2512–13. 
 14 See id. at 2513, 2515. 
 15 See id. at 2516 (“But in throwing up its hands, the majority misses some-
thing under its nose: What it says can’t be done has been done.”). 
 16 Id. (“Over the past several years, federal courts across the country—includ-
ing, but not exclusively, in the decisions below—have largely converged on a 
standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims (striking down both 
Democratic and Republican districting plans in the process).”). 
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it presented as technical issues relating to the definition of standards 
and the application of appropriate legal tests.17 It ended with an off-
ramp for the federal courts and an unpersuasive denial that this ju-
dicial abdication left the people of the United States no access to 
justice relating to the vote dilution on which partisan gerrymanders 
are built.18 The majority reached this radical conclusion by discuss-
ing partisan gerrymanders without locating that discussion within 
election jurisprudence, without acknowledging the harm that parti-
san gerrymanders inflict on individual voters, who are only allowed 
to cast a diluted vote, without acknowledging the harm to democ-
racy itself and with only occasionally referencing the constitution-
ality of certain partisan gerrymanders.19 
Efforts in the majority opinion to reconcile the reasoning with 
the result required a careful analysis of not only what was written 
but how it was written, as well as a careful consideration of what 
was not written. Silence played a significant role in the majority 
opinion. This is well-concealed radicalism undermining the very 
foundation of the Constitution—the principle that the people choose 
their government and the principle that government is accountable 
to the people. 
The dissent offered a reminder of the role of voters and voting 
as the source of sovereignty under the Constitution.20 Silence played 
no role in the dissenting opinion. The dissent documented the harms 
inflicted on individual citizens and on the democratic system 
through partisan gerrymandering.21 Without honest elections, the 
foundational premise of the Constitution has no operational mean-
ing. Without access to federal courts, voting rights cannot be pro-
tected and voter suppression cannot be combatted. Treating the 
question of partisan gerrymandering as nonjusticiable imposes 
 
 17 See id. at 2500, 2507 (majority opinion). 
 18 See id. at 2506–08. 
 19 See id. at 2495, 2499. These references were cryptic and were based only 
on one case not directly involved with elections and voting. See id. at 2499. Nev-
ertheless, references to the constitutionality of partisan gerrymanders is like a land 
mine hidden in the language of the majority opinion in case it might be useful in 
a future case seeking to strip partisan gerrymanders from the constitutional pro-
tection afforded them by the court’s holding that partisan gerrymandering cases 
are not justiciable. 
 20 See id. at 2511–12 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 21 See id. at 2512. 
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lasting harm without meaningful remedies on both individual voters 
and the democratic system. At the same time, so the majority seemed 
to claim, it will protect the Court from undue entanglement in con-
tested and divisive issues.22 In short, the Court cast its vote for voter 
suppression without appearing to do so. 
How did this happen? It happened because there was a majority 
on the Court that supported an opinion that was carefully and clev-
erly designed to produce the result that partisan gerrymanders are 
not justiciable.23 In other words, there was a majority on the Court 
for this form of voter suppression. Why this was so is itself an intri-
guing question, but it is not the question addressed in this Article. 
Here, the focus is on how the majority crafted its opinion without 
acknowledging what it was doing. 
Judicial opinions are not simply a discussion of the law as ap-
plied to the facts of a case. Opinions are constructed.24 They reflect 
both tactical and strategic considerations.25 In other words, judicial 
opinions reflect a conscious, intentional framework identifying the 
issues the opinion will and will not discuss, the facts that it will and 
will not acknowledge, the precedents it will rely on and past cases 
that it will not mention. Judicial opinions end in a manner consistent 
with how they begin.26 Frameworks usually include what may be 
called a game plan dealing with how the elements of the framework 
will be presented, what will be the tone of the opinion, and what 
kind of language will be used to present essential claims.27 Judicial 
 
 22 Id. at 2495–97 (majority opinion) (distinguishing Court’s role in one-per-
son, one-vote and racial gerrymandering from its role in general partisan gerry-
mandering). 
 23 See id. at 2507–08. 
 24 See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: 
Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1386 (1995). 
 25 See id. at 1394 (discussing complex choices judges must make when artic-
ulating legal principals, choosing between “tests couched in general or even ab-
stract terms—mansions of many rooms in which implementing judges move 
about freely—and tests using very specific words that cabin judges’ discretion 
tightly.”). 
 26 See id. at 1386–88. 
 27 See id. at 1405 (“The basic analytical structure that judges use to decide 
such cases—be it risk assessment, utilitarian weighing of costs, or political phi-
losophy—not only determines the results but displays the judge’s own inner 
thought processes. The rhetoric will generally follow that of the analytical mode 
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opinions do not explicitly articulate the framework or the game 
plan.28 Sometimes these frameworks, along with the embedded 
game plans, are obvious, and sometimes they are not.29 Sometimes 
it is possible to understand the reasoning in an opinion without fo-
cusing directly on the framework and the game plan. Rucho is not 
one of those cases. 
The majority decision achieved its remarkable and alarming out-
come by simply refusing to treat partisan gerrymanders as a form of 
voter suppression or, indeed, as an activity that is related to voting 
at all. Partisan gerrymanders were treated as a hyper-technical issue 
of defining a standard of partisanship.30 Defining the issue as one of 
procedural fairness and claiming that the federal courts are not 
equipped to deal with such an issue allowed the majority to claim 
that the Court was committed to good government at the very time 
it was casting its lot with voter suppression that undermined democ-
racy.31 In a strategic commitment to silence, the majority acknowl-
edged no harm arising from partisan gerrymanders.32 Silence was so 
important to the majority opinion that only rarely and briefly did the 
Court refer to judicial restraint,33 lest it become apparent that any 
benefit to the Court came at a very high cost to voters and to democ-
racy. Silence and avoidance were so important to the majority that 
it treated the significant constitutional issues in this case as matters 
of technical detail that could and should be subdivided into slices 
and snippets of issues that could be separated or reaggregated as 
necessary to suit the majority’s purposes.34 This remarkable position 
could not have been unconsidered. No one would have written an 
opinion dealing with partisan gerrymandering without considering 
 
chosen, and the adoption of a particular way of analyzing the problem may be as 
important to the judge as the instant result.”). 
 28 See id. at 1405 (“Their rhetoric will sound very neutral and principle ori-
ented, as if the results in this or any one case were secondary. The authors, how-
ever, are quite aware that they are determining or influencing the outcome of many 
cases, defining a field of law and the considerations or values that will predomi-
nate.”). 
 29 See id. 
 30 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499–500, 2507 (2019). 
 31 See id.; id. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 32 See id. at 2506 (majority opinion); but see id. at 2516 (Kagan, J., dissent-
ing). 
 33 See id. at 2506–07 (majority opinion). 
 34 See id. 
466 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:459 
 
the role of voting in the legitimacy of the Constitutional system, and 
no one would have been so unmindful of the harm arising from this 
omission, unless they specifically intended to do this. 
The dissent also had a framework and a game plan. Nothing 
about the dissent was hidden or indirect. Silence played no role. Big 
constitutional issues like the sovereignty of the people and account-
ability to the people were not disaggregated but remained to be con-
sidered in their fulsome import for democracy and for the rights of 
voters.35 The dissent identified the issue as voter suppression.36 The 
dissent identified the harms inflicted on individual voters and on de-
mocracy.37 The dissent found the relevant facts in the record com-
piled by the lower courts as triers of fact and found the relevant law 
in the Constitution and its history.38 To the dissent, the core issue 
was to avoid voter suppression through vote dilution and to maintain 
the ability of the people to exercise their constitutional role as the 
sovereign that chooses the people who will govern them—at least 
until the next election.39 To the dissent, voters’ assurance that they 
will be able to cast an undiluted vote in the next election is their 
expression of sovereignty and their means of holding their repre-
sentatives accountable.40 To the dissent, this is the core idea of de-
mocracy.41 As such, the dissent identified the harms arising from 
partisan gerrymanders that permit politicians to entrench themselves 
as rulers over voters who do not wish to be ruled by them. Partisan 
gerrymanders matter because they violate the right of individual vot-
ers and undermine democracy as a system of government.42 Like the 
majority opinion, the dissent illustrates how outcomes are shaped by 
the analytical framework, by the questions acknowledged, and by 
the questions neither asked nor acknowledged.43 
These themes, and the frameworks and game plans written by 
the majority and the dissent, are considered in four parts, each of 
 
 35 See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 36 See id. at 2513 (“Partisan gerrymandering operates through vote dilution—
the devaluation of one citizen’s vote as compared to others.”). 
 37 See id. at 2514–15. 
 38 See id. at 2509–12. 
 39 See id. at 2511–13. 
 40 See id. at 2512–14. 
 41 See id. at 2512. 
 42 Id. at 2513. 
 43 See id. at 2516–23. 
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which compares and contrasts the approaches of the majority and 
the dissent. Part I asks where each of the opinions begin and what 
questions each opinion sets out to address. What values are refer-
enced in each opinion? Why do partisan gerrymanders matter? Un-
der what circumstances do they matter? What role should the judi-
cial branch of the federal government play? In short, what is a par-
tisan gerrymandering case about and why do partisan gerrymander-
ing cases matter, if at all? 
Part II locates these issues and values in the broader fields of 
election law and constitutional law. It poses the question of whether 
partisan gerrymanders are technical puzzles or choices of values. It 
then considers how the answers to this question shape the analysis 
of the facts in the cases before the Court in Rucho. This Part suggests 
that partisan gerrymanders cannot be separated from the rights and 
duties of voters and that voting is both an individual right and a con-
stitutional duty to “ordain and establish this Constitution.”44 If “We 
the People”45 are sovereign, voting is our means of expressing and 
exercising that sovereignty. The harms addressed and the constitu-
tional predicates available to redress these harms turn on vote dilu-
tion, which is to say disenfranchisement of voters of the “other” po-
litical party. 
Part III considers how the majority and the dissent view the rea-
soning of the lower federal courts in the two cases before the Court. 
The majority concluded that partisan gerrymanders raise political 
questions that make cases arising from partisan gerrymanders non-
justiciable. The dissent concluded that the very standard that the ma-
jority claimed could not be developed by a federal court had already 
been developed by the lower courts. 
Part IV considers how Rucho ends, if, indeed, it does end. Does 
the majority see its opinion as a means of weaponizing the political 
question doctrine in the service of voter suppression? Did the ma-
jority understand what the lower courts had achieved in shaping a 
path forward in partisan gerrymandering cases, or did the majority 
deliberately ignore the path forward laid out in the lower court opin-
ions because it was intent on permitting partisan gerrymanders as 
disguised instruments of voter suppression? Did the majority see its 
opinion as protection for the Court, justified even at the cost of 
 
 44 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 45 Id. 
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abdicating its duty to do justice in cases dealing with an issue as 
foundational as voting and the sovereignty of the people? Did the 
majority actively suppress voters and voting, or did it abandon vot-
ers to the predations and ambitions of the political branches? What 
does Rucho mean for democracy? 
I. DISTINCTIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR DIVERGENT OUTCOMES 
The majority opinion is an enigma. Indeed, it is a radical enigma 
that denies the targets of partisan gerrymandering access to justice. 
However, it is never quite clear why the legal reasoning leads to this 
conclusion. Every element of the framework is so veiled that it is 
difficult to state with any certainty what the majority thinks the issue 
is and what the precedents are. At every turn, what the majority does 
not say raises questions about what it does say, yet these questions 
are never addressed. The game plan in the majority opinion de-
ployed an impressively broad array of the skills of a renowned ad-
vocate who insisted on at least trying to control the discussion, limit 
the applicable precedents, and so describe either the precedents or 
the facts that they become scarcely recognizable. It is possible that 
the majority hoped to write a quiet opinion that simply rid the federal 
courts of what the majority may have regarded as annoying cases. 
But that was not to be. 
The dissent was a passionate refutation of every aspect of the 
majority opinion—its identification of the issue, its mode of reason-
ing, and certainly, its holding. The dissent developed an entirely dis-
tinct framework and argued it out loud and without strategic or tac-
tical silence. Grounded in constitutional values, the dissent argued 
for the rights of the people of the United States and the protection of 
the political system of the United States.46 It argued that federal 
courts should do their jobs and demonstrated that the lower courts 
had been doing this throughout the history of the cases before the 
Court in Rucho.47 Like the majority, the dissent fully understood that 
where it began would be foundational in determining where it 
ended. 
 
 46 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2524–25 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 47 Id. at 2516. 
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A. Beginning with the Court: A Framework for Judicial 
Abdication 
The majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts treated a neutral 
standard as an end in itself. From the beginning of its opinion, the 
majority stated that the cases before it “require us to consider once 
again whether claims of excessive partisanship in districting are 
‘justiciable’—that is, properly suited for resolution by the federal 
courts.”48 The majority stated that “[t]he districting plans at issue 
here are highly partisan, by any measure. The question is whether 
the courts below appropriately exercised judicial power when they 
found them unconstitutional as well.”49 These concerns with the role 
of the federal courts took center stage in the majority opinion.50 Vot-
ers were not on stage at all and voting as a constitutional process 
was nowhere to be found. Instead, the majority opinion focused on 
Article III and the role of the federal courts, stating that Article III 
“limits federal courts to deciding ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”51 
Chief Justice Roberts then stated that “[w]e have understood that 
limitation to mean that federal courts can address only questions 
‘historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial 
process.’”52 He then presented a series of cursory references to the 
political question doctrine53 and concluded by framing the question 
in this case in the following terms: “The question here is whether 
there is an ‘appropriate role for the Federal Judiciary’ in remedying 
the problem of partisan gerrymandering—whether such claims are 
claims of legal right, resolvable according to legal principles, or po-
litical questions that must find their resolution elsewhere.”54 
It may seem that the majority began in a strange place—some-
where in the middle of the discussion of something that is not quite 
the heart of what is at issue here. The majority opinion admitted that 
partisan gerrymanders are a problem but not such a significant prob-
lem that the Court must attempt to find a way to address them.55 It 
 
 48 Id. at 2491 (majority opinion). 
 49 Id. 
 50 See id. at 2496. 
 51 Id. at 2493. 
 52 Id. at 2493–94 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)). 
 53 See id. at 2494. 
 54 Id. at 2494 (citing Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926–37 (2018)). 
 55 See id. at 2494, 2501. 
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never acknowledged harms to voters or to the United States political 
system. This, as becomes abundantly clear, precluded discussion of 
the issue that would have made the majority’s holding seem even 
more inexplicable. What was the majority doing? Was it limiting 
access to justice in voting rights matters? Was it protecting the fed-
eral courts from the intense controversies swirling around voting 
and elections? Was it tipping the balance in favor of some political 
interest? It is impossible to say with any certainty, and that appears 
to have been by design. 
B. Beginning with the Voters: A Framework for Protecting 
Democracy 
The dissent began with democracy and the Constitution and 
never wavered in putting both at the core of the opinion.56 In the 
dissent, Rucho is about vote dilution and voter suppression, and it is 
about a Constitution based on the sovereignty of the people.57 Most 
of all, the dissent is about the sovereignty of the people depending 
on the ability of the people to vote without having their votes diluted 
and their right to vote suppressed by officeholders seeking to en-
trench themselves in power.58 It condemned the majority opinion as 
“tragically wrong” because it misconstrued the Constitution and the 
role of the people under the Constitution.59 
Justice Kagan’s beginning could not be further from Chief Jus-
tice Roberts’ beginning and it could not have been closer to the Con-
stitution and the issues raised in this case. She began: 
For the first time ever, this Court refuses to rem-
edy a constitutional violation because it thinks the 
task beyond judicial capabilities. 
And not just any constitutional violation. The 
partisan gerrymanders in these cases deprived citi-
zens of the most fundamental of their constitutional 
rights: the rights to participate equally in the political 
process, to join with others to advance political 
 
 56 See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 57 See id. at 2511–13. 
 58 See id. at 2512. 
 59 Id. at 2509. 
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beliefs, and to choose their political representatives. 
In so doing, the partisan gerrymanders here debased 
and dishonored our democracy, turning upside-down 
the core American idea that all governmental power 
derives from the people. These gerrymanders ena-
bled politicians to entrench themselves in office as 
against voters’ preferences. They promoted partisan-
ship above respect for the popular will. They encour-
aged a politics of polarization and dysfunction. If left 
unchecked, gerrymanders like the ones here may ir-
reparably damage our system of government.60 
The difference between this starting point and Chief Justice Roberts’ 
starting point could not be more pronounced. Justice Kagan began 
with the Constitution, constitutional rights, and constitutional 
harms.61 She wonders whether “[m]aybe the majority errs in these 
cases because it pays so little attention to the constitutional harms at 
their core.”62 She noted that the majority “dutifully recit[es]” the 
facts in the two cases here but then “leaves them forever behind, 
instead immersing itself in everything that could conceivably go 
amiss if courts became involved.”63 
In the face of this approach by the majority, the dissent chose to 
focus on the facts, “[t]o recount exactly what politicians in North 
Carolina and Maryland did to entrench their parties in political of-
fice, whatever the electorate might think” and then “to elaborate on 
the constitutional injury those politicians wreaked, to our demo-
cratic system and to individuals’ rights.”64 Recounting the facts and 
considering the harms arising from the partisan gerrymanders was 
of critical importance to Justice Kagan because it “will help in con-
sidering whether courts confronting partisan gerrymandering claims 
are really so hamstrung—so unable to carry out their constitutional 
duties—as the majority thinks.”65 She then urged the readers of her 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 See id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
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presentation of the facts and the harms they caused to “ask yourself: 
Is this how American democracy is supposed to work?”66 
Justice Kagan then presented a saga of what intentional partisan 
gerrymanders accomplished through experts using the latest tech-
nology to draw electoral maps.67 She shows that gerrymanders re-
flect the ambitions and values of the party in power and that, in each 
state, mapmakers accomplished the partisan goals they were paid to 
produce.68 She found that “Maryland’s Democrats proved no less 
successful than North Carolina’s Republicans in devising a voter-
proof map.”69 She also shows that the officeholders in charge of 
these efforts spoke openly about their purposes and made these pur-
poses abundantly clear to the mapmakers selected for this important 
role.70 The results produced numerous potential maps, including at 
least one map in each case that served the purposes that the map-
maker was hired to produce.71 Experience showed that the mapmak-
ers were skillful and fulfilled their contractual obligations.72 The 
new district, or districts, produced reliable partisan results that en-
trenched the paying party in a position of power over the will of the 
people who were assigned, through packing or cracking, to have 
their votes diluted and, thus, their right to vote suppressed.73 Justice 
Kagan described this as a “grisly tale” of partisan entrenchment.74 
Justice Kagan then asked again: “Is that how American democracy 
is supposed to work?”75 She answered her own question by observ-
ing, “I have yet to meet the person who thinks so.”76 She is equally 
clear and direct in articulating the reason that no one thinks so, stat-
ing: “If there is a single idea that made our Nation (and that our Na-
tion commended to the world), it is this one: The people are sover-
eign.”77 Sovereignty of the people means that the people choose 
 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 2509–11. 
 68 See id. at 2510–11. 
 69 Id. at 2511. 
 70 See id. at 2510–11. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See id. 
 73 Id. at 2510–14. 
 74 Id. at 2510. 
 75 Id. at 2511. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
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their representatives; this requires voting and care in preserving vot-
ing rights.78 The dissent stated clearly that, 
Free and fair and periodic elections are the key to that 
vision. The people get to choose their representa-
tives. And then they get to decide, at regular inter-
vals, whether to keep them . . . . Election day—next 
year, and two years later, and two years after that—
is what links the people to their representatives, and 
gives the people their sovereign power. That day is 
the foundation of democratic governance.79 
In the next sentence, the dissent concluded, “partisan gerrymander-
ing can make it meaningless.”80 
II. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
The majority expressed no particular concern, much less alarm, 
over vote dilution and voter suppression resulting from partisan ger-
rymandering. It focused on the harm that courts would experience if 
they heard these cases.81 It did not focus on the harm to the people 
and to democracy from partisan gerrymandering, and it only 
acknowledged these harms in passing at the end of its opinion.82 The 
dissent linked the selective dilution of some votes in order to en-
trench politicians of a different political party in power to funda-
mental attacks on the Constitution and on the principle of the sover-
eignty of the people.83 The majority asked how this might affect 
 
 78 See id. 
 79 Id. at 2511–12. Kagan bolsters her statement by citing to James Madison 
for the proposition that “republican liberty” requires “not only, that all power 
should be derived from the people; but, that those entrusted with it should be kept 
in dependence on the people.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 4 (James Madison) (J. 
& A. McLean eds., 1788). 
 80 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 81 See id. at 2499–500, 2503–05 (majority opinion). 
 82 See id. at 2506. 
 83 See id. at 2512–13 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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courts.84 The dissent addressed how this does in fact affect Ameri-
can democracy.85 
A. The Majority Refuses to Acknowledge Harms to 
Democracy 
The majority asserted that “[p]artisan gerrymandering is nothing 
new.”86 Although true, it is far from clear what argument the major-
ity was attempting to make. The majority recounted gerrymandering 
controversies even during the debates over ratification of the Con-
stitution, but concluded that “[a]t no point was there a suggestion 
that the federal courts had a role to play”87 and then added that “[n]or 
was there any indication that the Framers had ever heard of courts 
doing such a thing.”88 While the majority made no argument based 
on this history, it did state that “[e]arly on, doubts were raised about 
the competence of the federal courts to resolve those questions.”89 
This is a robust assertion of the meaning of the silence relating to 
courts that the majority had found in the ratification debates. 
At this point, recognition of Baker v. Carr90 became unavoida-
ble. Nothing in Chief Justice Roberts’ brief acknowledgment of 
Baker as a “leading case” indicated its significance in challenging 
voter suppression and vote dilution.91 Nothing in the majority opin-
ion acknowledged the new era of voting rights litigation that fol-
lowed the Court’s decision in Baker.92 He noted that the district 
court had held that the case was not justiciable, based on Colegrove 
v. Green and other Supreme Court precedents, but that “[t]his Court 
reversed.”93 He instead emphasized the Court’s review of the 
 
 84 See id. at 2499–500, 2503–05 (majority opinion). 
 85 See id. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 86 Id. at 2494 (majority opinion). 
 87 Id. at 2496. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. The Court then cited two of the last of the Jim Crow cases through 
which the federal courts upheld the suppression of black voters in blatant disre-
gard of the 15th Amendment. Id. (first citing Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932); 
and then citing Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946)) (both cases holding that 
gerrymanders were not justiciable). 
 90 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 91 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2496. 
 92 See id. 
 93 Id. (referencing Colegrove, 328 U.S. 549). 
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political question doctrine, “including whether there is ‘a lack of ju-
dicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.’”94 
The Chief Justice then summarized the Court’s decision, stating 
that, “[t]he Court concluded that the claim of population inequality 
among districts did not fall into that category, because such a claim 
could be decided under basic equal protection principles.”95 From 
this, one might assume that Baker was a relatively predictable or 
insignificant case, rather than the beginning of a new jurisprudence 
taking account of the valence of each vote. The majority refused to 
acknowledge that the world of elections and voting had changed or 
started to change and that Baker and its numerous consequential 
progeny reframed vote dilution and voter suppression.96 The only 
other reference, albeit oblique and indirect, to this line of cases was 
a subsequent assertion that this line of cases does not apply in any 
way to partisan gerrymander cases.97 
The Chief Justice then embraced the concept of a “constitutional 
political” gerrymander.98 The majority opinion neither addressed 
what a “political gerrymander” might be nor discussed how it might 
relate to a partisan gerrymander. But the reference to a “political 
gerrymander” moved the discussion away from the powerful rea-
soning and holdings of Baker and its progeny—grounded in the 
rights of voters and the constitutional structure based on the sover-
eignty of the people—to a far more circumscribed discussion of 
grounds for determining that an issue raises a political question that 
cannot be decided by the federal courts.99 Moving the analysis away 
from voting was essential to Chief Justice Roberts’ determination 
that partisan gerrymanders are political questions and, as such, may 
 
 94 Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
 95 Id. (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 226). 
 96 In 1964, the Supreme Court issued two landmark decisions that extended 
the reasoning of Baker v. Carr to Congressional districts and to both houses of a 
bicameral state legislature. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8, 18 (1964) (re-
quiring “one person, one vote” apportionment based on population in congres-
sional districts in Georgia); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558, 568–570, 586–
87 (1964) (requiring that both houses of Alabama state legislature be apportioned 
on the basis of population consistent with the principle of “one person, one vote”). 
 97 See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497 (referencing numerous “one-person, one-
vote” cases without expressly referencing Baker). 
 98 Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)). 
 99 See id. 
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not be challenged by voters in federal courts.100 Vote dilution and 
voter suppression may thus continue undisturbed. The shift in the 
terms of the discussion from “partisan” to “political” consideration 
allowed Chief Justice Roberts to claim a principled position, al-
though one that required a contrived argument that the Framers ap-
proved of this position.101 The Chief Justice claimed that: 
To hold that legislators cannot take partisan interests 
into account when drawing district lines would es-
sentially countermand the Framers’ decision to en-
trust districting to political entities. The “central 
problem” is not determining whether a jurisdiction 
has engaged in partisan gerrymandering. It is “deter-
mining when political gerrymandering has gone too 
far.”102 
At this point, the Chief Justice abandoned any references to 
Baker to instead offer a review of the partisan gerrymandering cases 
focused solely on a judicially discoverable and manageable standard 
for determining whether there has been an impermissible partisan 
gerrymander, rather than the unexplained category of a “constitu-
tional political gerrymander” within the meaning of Hunt v. 
Cromartie.103 
The Chief Justice took a position similar to that of Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurrence in Vieth v. Jubelier, where Justice Kennedy 
stated that an appropriate standard must have a “limited and precise 
rationale” and be “clear, manageable, and politically neutral.”104 He 
found support for this approach in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence 
in Davis v. Bandemer.105 
Chief Justice Roberts then claimed that “[p]artisan gerrymander-
ing claims invariably sound in a desire for proportional 
 
 100 See id. 
 101 See id. 
 102 Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (2004)). 
 103 See id. at 2497–98. 
 104 See id. at 2498 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306–08 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring)). 
 105 See id. (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring)). 
2021] PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS 477 
 
representation.”106 He emphasized that the Court had never found 
that the Constitution required proportional representation.107 As a 
result, the Chief Justice claimed that plaintiffs phrase their claims in 
other terms, usually implicating fairness.108 His rejection of fairness 
as a relevant or even reasonable value in the discussion of partisan 
gerrymandering became the centerpiece of his rejection and even 
ridicule of the idea that partisan gerrymanders imposed harms on 
voters and on the constitutional system.109 He explained his ap-
proach in the following terms: 
Unable to claim that the Constitution requires pro-
portional representation outright, plaintiffs inevita-
bly ask the courts to make their own political judg-
ment about how much representation particular po-
litical parties deserve—based on the votes of their 
supporters—and to rearrange the challenged districts 
to achieve that end. But federal courts are not 
equipped to apportion political power as a matter of 
fairness, nor is there any basis for concluding that 
they were authorized to do so.110 
Quoting Justice Scalia in Vieth, Chief Justice Roberts found that 
“‘[f]airness’ does not seem to us a judicially manageable stand-
ard.”111 He then argued that there is no “‘clear, manageable and po-
litically neutral’ test for fairness.”112 The first problem identified by 
the majority was that “it is not even clear what fairness looks like in 
this context.”113 The next sentence observes that “[t]here is a large 
measure of ‘unfairness’ in any winner-take-all system.”114 Chief 
Justice Roberts speculated that “[f]airness may mean a greater num-
ber of competitive districts” but then observed that undoing the 
 
 106 Id. at 2499. 
 107 See id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 See id. at 2499–502. 
 110 Id. at 2499. 
 111 Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291 (2004)). 
 112 Id. at 2500. The internal quotation is in the original but there is no citation. 
It seems to be a reference to the language of Justice Kennedy in Vieth, which 
appears in Rucho as something of mantra. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307–08. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
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previous cracking and packing in the interest of more competitive 
districts “could be a recipe for disaster for the disadvantaged 
party.”115 A second alternative, according to the Chief Justice, might 
require more cracking and packing reflecting the “gravitational pull 
of proportionality” so that each party has “its ‘appropriate’ share of 
‘safe’ seats.”116 However, this approach, the majority asserted, 
would undermine making districts more competitive.117 A third pos-
sibility is to measure fairness “by adherence to ‘traditional’ district-
ing criteria, such as maintaining political subdivisions, keeping 
communities of interest together, and protecting incumbents.”118 
But this approach would not serve the goal of neutrality. At this 
point, the Chief Justice declared defeat and concluded that: 
Deciding among just these different versions of fair-
ness (you can imagine many others) poses basic 
questions that are political, not legal. There are no 
legal standards discernible in the Constitution for 
making such judgments, let alone limited and precise 
standards that are clear, manageable, and politically 
neutral. Any judicial decision on what is “fair” in this 
context would be an “unmoored determination” of 
the sort characteristic of a political question beyond 
the competence of the federal courts.119 
The majority claimed the determination that fairness cannot be 
given operational meaning in the context of defining electoral dis-
tricts means that the “determinative question” relating to partisan 
gerrymanders—”How much is too much?”—cannot be answered.120 
The majority asked: “At what point does permissible partisanship 
become unconstitutional?”121 This is a rhetorical question, followed 
 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130–31 (1986)). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. (citations omitted). 
 119 Id. (citing Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)). 
 120 Id. at 2501. 
 121 Id. This question would have greater force if the opinion did not inter-
change the idea of permissible partisanship for the idea of a constitutional partisan 
gerrymander, which are two quite distinct things. They may become the same 
thing if every district reflects an intentional partisan gerrymander and the concept 
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by several others, that the Chief Justice made no attempt to con-
sider.122 He concluded where he intended to conclude and again 
drew his reasoning and his language from Vieth, stating: 
Even assuming the court knew which version of fair-
ness to be looking for, there are no discernible and 
manageable standards for deciding whether there has 
been a violation. The questions are “unguided and ill 
suited to the development of judicial standards,” and 
“results from one gerrymandering case to the next 
would likely be disparate and inconsistent.”123 
At the end of the section of the opinion dealing with what the 
majority considered the applicable precedents, it raised the issue it 
attributes to the appellees in this case, who “contend that if we can 
adjudicate one-person, one-vote claims, we can also assess partisan 
gerrymandering claims.”124 The majority struggled to address a 
question premised on the existence of a larger voting rights jurispru-
dence that is relevant to partisan gerrymandering cases. The first 
sentence of the response was short but revealing, asserting that “the 
one-person, one-vote rule is relatively easy to administer as a matter 
of math.”125 The next sentence marked a denial of the relevance of 
voters in partisan gerrymander cases, which the majority now 
treated as solely about political parties.126 The majority took the po-
sition that partisan gerrymander cases are not easy to administer “be-
cause the Constitution supplies no objective measure for assessing 
whether a districting map treats a political party fairly.”127 The ma-
jority did not even acknowledge its pivot from voters to political 
parties or why such a distinction might be appropriate or what rela-
tionships between voters and political parties might be relevant. In-
stead, the majority simply asserted, without explanation, that “[i]t 
 
of a constitutional partisan gerrymander is given operational constitutional mean-
ing. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296 (2004)); Vieth, 541 U.S. 
at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See id. 
 127 Id. 
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hardly follows from the principle that each person must have an 
equal say in the election of representatives that a person is entitled 
to have his political party achieve representation in some way com-
mensurate to its share of statewide support.”128 The majority then 
extended this reasoning to vote dilution claims in the following 
terms: 
More fundamentally, “vote dilution” in the one-per-
son, one-vote cases refers to the idea that each vote 
must carry equal weight. In other words, each repre-
sentative must be accountable to (approximately) the 
same number of constituents. That requirement does 
not extend to political parties. It does not mean that 
each party must be influential in proportion to its 
number of supporters.”129 
This pivot from accountability to influence and from individual vot-
ers to political parties captures the reasoning of the majority opinion. 
Why the majority found that this particular pivot required no sup-
porting reasoning is itself unexplained by the remainder of the opin-
ion. One might reasonably think that a partisan gerrymandering case 
is itself about the mechanisms of accountability available to voters 
in particular districts in the face of extreme partisanship. That, after 
all, was the claim in this case. However, that was not the position 
taken in the reasoning in the majority opinion. Here, Chief Justice 
Roberts characterized partisan gerrymandering claims as guarantee-
ing a certain level of representation to political parties.130 
The majority opinion also rejected the idea that the cases involv-
ing racial gerrymanders “provide an appropriate standard for as-
sessing partisan gerrymandering.”131 The majority drew the follow-
ing distinction: “Unlike partisan gerrymandering claims, a racial 
gerrymandering claim does not ask for a fair share of political power 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See id. at 2501–02 n.1 (referring to an assertion in the dissent “that the 
Framers viewed political parties ‘with deep suspicion’” and then managing to turn 
this observation into the insinuation that the dissent used this observation to sup-
port “a constitutional theory that guarantees a certain degree of representation to 
political parties.”); see infra notes 106–17 and accompanying text. 
 131 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502. 
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and influence, with all the justiciability conundrums that entails. It 
asks instead for the elimination of a racial classification. A partisan 
gerrymandering claim cannot ask for the elimination of partisan-
ship.”132 
Justice is not possible because the need for precise metrics has 
proved, in the majority’s view, too difficult to satisfy with sufficient 
precision.133 Reaching this decision was made possible by the care-
ful avoidance of considerations of justice and the role of voting in 
achieving it. The majority opinion was designed to avoid what the 
dissent treated as foundational values by treating them as less con-
stitutionally significant than the complexities of implementation. 
This asserted problem was exacerbated by the barely articulated 
premise that partisan gerrymanders require that only one standard 
be applied,134 ignoring the possibility that the empirical diversity of 
partisan gerrymanders might be addressed by a range of standards 
based on a constitutionally permissible methodology. In other 
words, the majority treated partisan gerrymanders as a doctrinal is-
sue rather than as an empirical issue. This may well have been part 
of the game plan—a deliberate insistence on an unachievable uni-
formity that impedes the identification and understanding of parti-
san gerrymanders. Because the majority refused to acknowledge the 
individual and systemic harms arising from partisan gerrymanders, 
it did not acknowledge that its understanding was attenuated. How 
it could have maintained that view after reading the opinions of the 
courts below, as well as at least certain amicus briefs, suggests that 
the majority was not clear about what it thought was at stake and for 
whom. 
B. The Dissent Affirms the Sovereignty of the People 
The dissent reminded the majority what is at stake in this case—
the viability of democracy based on the sovereignty of the people, 
who exercise their sovereignty through voting and the right of indi-
viduals to vote.135 Both are necessary. Yet, noted the dissent, neither 
was addressed by the majority.136 It reminded the majority, which 
 
 132 Id. 
 133 See id. 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 136 See id. at 2509, 2511–12. 
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quoted the language of Vieth repeatedly, that Justice Kennedy had 
observed that partisan gerrymanders can lead to “rigg[ed] elec-
tions.”137 The dissent also reminded the majority that “this Court has 
recognized” that the “‘core principle of republican govern-
ment’ . . . is ‘that the voters should choose their representatives, not 
the other way around.’”138 The dissent concluded: “Partisan gerry-
mandering turns it the other way around. By that mechanism, poli-
ticians can cherry-pick voters to ensure their reelection. And the 
power becomes, as Madison put it, ‘in the Government over the peo-
ple.’”139 
The dissent emphasized that “[t]he majority disputes none of 
this.”140 The dissent found this statement worth repeating, possibly 
hoping that doing so would allow the majority to understand the im-
plications of its agreement: “I think it important to underscore that 
fact: The majority disputes none of what I have said (or will say) 
about how gerrymanders undermine democracy. Indeed, the major-
ity concedes (really, how could it not?) that gerrymandering is ‘in-
compatible with democratic principles.’”141 At this point the dissent 
asked: “And therefore what?”142 and noted that “[t]hat recognition 
would seem to demand a response.”143 The dissent identified two 
ideas put forward by the majority. One idea is to leave the entire 
matter to the political branches, and the other is that political gerry-
manders are as old as the Constitution.144 Justice Kagan found the 
suggestion that the issue of gerrymanders should be left to the polit-
ical branches “so dubious on its face” that a response could be post-
poned until the end of the dissent.145 The idea that the long history 
of partisan gerrymanders justifies complacency about them was re-
jected by the dissent as “ha[ving] no cause.”146 
 
 137 Id. at 2512 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring)). 
 138 Id. (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 
576 U.S. 787, 824 (2015)). 
 139 Id. (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794)). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. (quoting id. at 2506 (majority opinion)). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
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Pointing to technological advances and reliance on big data, the 
dissent looked at the methodology used by the lower courts and 
warned that “gerrymanders will only get worse (or depending on 
your perspective, better) as time goes on—as data becomes ever 
more fine-grained and data analysis techniques continue to im-
prove.”147 Because the framework of the dissent was grounded in 
constitutional values regarding voting and the sovereignty of the 
people of the United States, the dissent reminded everyone, includ-
ing the members of the majority, that “someplace along this road, 
‘we the people’ become sovereign no longer.”148 
It is the ability to acknowledge the harms arising from partisan 
gerrymanders that distinguishes the two opinions. The majority tried 
to normalize partisan gerrymanders while claiming that they could 
not be addressed through judicial remedies.149 The dissent identified 
and analyzed the harms and found ways to achieve what the majority 
found to be impossible.150 It is the framework based on constitu-
tional principles that permitted the dissent to identify and address 
harms in the interest of democratic governance and the sovereignty 
of the people. The dissent provided a trenchant summary of its po-
sition, stating: “Partisan gerrymandering of the kind before us not 
only subverts democracy (as if that weren’t bad enough). It violates 
individuals’ constitutional rights as well.”151 The dissent did not 
claim to have special insight in stating the effect on individual vot-
ers, but instead it found that “[t]his Court has recognized extreme 
partisan gerrymandering as such a violation for many years.”152 This 
practice operates through vote dilution, which the dissent explained 
as “the devaluation of one citizen’s vote as compared to others.”153 
According to the dissent, vote dilution implicates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—which the dissent stated 
“we long ago recognized, ‘guarantees the opportunity for equal par-
ticipation by all voters in the election’ of legislators.”154 The dissent 
amplified its reliance on what have become known as the one-
 
 147 Id. at 2513. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See id. at 2494, 2502 (majority opinion). 
 150 See generally id. at 2509–25 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 151 Id. at 2513. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 2514 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964)). 
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person, one-vote cases, observing that the opportunity for equal par-
ticipation “can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight 
of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the 
free exercise of the franchise.”155 
The dissent noted that partisan gerrymandering also implicates 
the First Amendment by inflicting both personal and associational 
harm.156 The dissent found that “[b]y diluting the votes of certain 
citizens, the State frustrates their efforts to translate those affiliations 
into political effectiveness.”157 
The dissent then reminded the majority that “[t]hough different 
Justices have described the constitutional harm in diverse ways, 
nearly all have agreed on this much: Extreme partisan gerrymander-
ing (as happened in North Carolina and Maryland) violates the Con-
stitution.”158 Indeed, the dissent again noted that “the majority never 
disagrees; it appears to accept the ‘principle that each person must 
have an equal say in the election of representatives.’”159 Looking 
forward to the majority’s discussion of standards applicable to par-
tisan gerrymanders, the dissent observed that, “without this settled 
and shared understanding that cases like these inflict constitutional 
injury, the question of whether there are judicially manageable 
standards for resolving them would never come up.”160 In sum, the 
dissent indicated the majority declares defeat prematurely, before it 
had allowed itself to understand both the issue and the possibility of 
a reasonable response. 
III. “FAIRNESS” IN DISTRICTING: DEBATING JUDICIAL 
CAPABILITIES AND THE LOWER COURTS’ DECISIONS 
Because the majority and dissent asked different questions at the 
beginning of their opinions, they focused on very different questions 
relating to the efforts made to draw congressional district boundaries 
 
 155 Id. (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555). 
 156 See id. 
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 159 Id. at 2515 (quoting id. at 2501 (majority opinion)). 
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in North Carolina and Maryland.161 Thus, the majority and the dis-
sent came to different conclusions about the opinions of the three-
judge district courts in each case. 
A. The Majority Holds That the Cases Are Not Justiciable 
The majority begins with a complete rejection of a role for a fed-
eral court in the matters before it in this case, stating: 
Appellees and the dissent propose a number of 
“tests” for evaluating partisan gerrymandering 
claims, but none meets the need for a limited and pre-
cise standard that is judicially discernible and man-
ageable. And none provides a solid grounding for 
judges to take the extraordinary step of reallocating 
power and influence between political parties.162 
This introduction to the assessment of the holdings and decisions in 
opinions by the lower federal courts in the North Carolina and Mar-
yland cases are consistent with the majority’s resolution to focus on 
the courts and not on the voters in this case. The majority uses this 
perspective to highlight the inadequacies of the standards and tests 
used by these courts with respect to each of the claims made in these 
cases. 
1. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM 
IN THE NORTH CAROLINA CASE 
The majority began with the test developed by the district court 
in North Carolina to evaluate the claim based on the Equal Protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.163 The district court de-
veloped a three-part test that required the plaintiffs to establish the 
state’s “predominant purpose” to dilute the vote of the Democratic 
Party voters164 and to establish that such vote dilution is “likely to 
persist” in subsequent elections.165 The defendants must also prove 
 
 161 Compare id. at 2494 (majority opinion), with id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dis-
senting). 
 162 Id. at 2502 (majority opinion). 
 163 See id. at 2492–93. 
 164 Id. at 2502 (citing Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d. 777, 865 
(M.D.N.C. 2018)). 
 165 Id. (citing Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 867). 
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that the discriminatory effects are “attributable to a legitimate state 
interest or other neutral explanation.”166 The majority dismissed 
each of the elements of this test briskly with cryptic conclusory pro-
nouncements.167 With respect to the first element, the majority as-
serted without further explanation that “determining that lines were 
drawn on the basis of partisanship does not indicate that the district-
ing was improper.”168 Perhaps by way of explanation, the majority 
then asserts that “[a] permissible intent—securing partisan ad-
vantage—does not become constitutionally impermissible, like ra-
cial discrimination, when the permissible intent ‘predominates.’”169 
This approach raises obvious questions that are not addressed. What 
makes seeking partisan advantage in this particular way constitu-
tionally permissible? The issue here is not just one of a constitution-
ally permissible intent—partisan advantage—but that inflicting the 
harm on targeted voters and on democracy itself goes far beyond 
some unspecified partisan intent. This rephrasing of a question with-
out appearing to have done so is part of the game plan that the ma-
jority devised. A political party that sends a solicitation for funds 
does not inflict harm on other voters in the same way that it does 
when it implements a partisan gerrymander to suppress voting. What 
other kinds of voter suppression activities would the majority be 
willing to claim might be consistent with the Constitution? It men-
tions nothing else in this opinion. Would any redistricting effort stop 
a modest or limited partisan advantage if it has the political authority 
and the political power to define a partisan advantage that would 
elect members of a particular political party? How persuasive is the 
majority’s earlier suggestion that partisan gerrymandering does not 
violate the Constitution?170 
The second factor, the likelihood of persistent dilution of the 
votes of voters from the non-favored party—the party that did not 
draw the district boundaries at issue—is dismissed as “prognostica-
tions as to the outcome of future elections.”171 The majority is 
 
 166 Id. (citing Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 868). 
 167 See id. at 2502–04. 
 168 Id. at 2502–03. 
 169 Id. at 2503. 
 170 See id. at 2499–500. 
 171 Id. at 2503. The majority asserts that 
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certainly correct that voters can change their preferences and their 
votes in future elections, but it is noteworthy that the examples given 
refer to examples not related to the redistricting plans at issue in this 
case.172 Even here, however, the main problem is that the Court is 
concerned more with the possible burden on the judges hearing these 
cases rather than on the voters supporting candidates in whose favor 
they can cast only diluted votes.173 After a rather scattershot parade 
of imponderables, the majority concludes that “asking judges to pre-
dict how a particular districting map will perform in future elections 
risks basing constitutional holdings on unstable ground outside ju-
dicial expertise.”174 The majority never considers the possibility that 
what seems such a daunting task might well be made manageable 
by adequate fact-finding based on contemporary comparables in the 
hands of the district courts in these cases. 
The majority summarily rejects the usefulness of the third 
prong—the defendants’ showing of a legitimate reason for the dis-
criminatory effects—stating that it “just restates the question.”175 
The majority never seemed to consider that this question was in-
tended as the basis of a balancing test that applied to the relative 
harms affecting certain voters and that, in these circumstances, it 
would aid in understanding the context of the factors at issue. 
2. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS IN BOTH CASES 
These cases also involved a three-part test related to the First 
Amendment that the majority rejected. The test is based on “proof 
of intent to burden individuals based on their voting history or party 
 
Judges must forecast with unspecified certainty whether a pro-
spective winner will have a margin of victory sufficient to per-
mit him to ignore the supporters of his defeated opponent (who-
ever that may turn out to be). Judges not only have to pick the 
winner—they have to beat the point spread. 
Id. 
 172 Id. at 2503–04. Remarking with respect to the redistricting efforts at issue 
in Bandemer and Vieth: “In our two leading partisan gerrymandering cases them-
selves, the predictions of durability proved to be dramatically wrong.” Id. at 2503. 
Whatever else one can conclude with respect to these two examples, it is certainly 
true that they occurred before the technological and data innovations that charac-
terize current gerrymandering efforts. 
 173 See id. at 2502–04. 
 174 Id. at 2503–04. 
 175 Id. at 2504. 
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affiliation; an actual burden on political speech or associational 
rights; and a causal link between the invidious intent and actual bur-
den.”176 
The majority began its critique of this test with an assertion that 
form controls substance and that form alone is sufficient.177 In its 
critique, the majority opinion stated that “there are no restrictions on 
speech, association, or any other First Amendment activities in the 
districting plans at issue. The plaintiffs are free to engage in those 
activities no matter what the effect of a plan may be on their dis-
trict.”178 There is no such provision in the plan because a successful 
gerrymander makes it unnecessary. If a gerrymander is done suc-
cessfully, it can suppress the voters and dilute votes without leaving 
fingerprints, apart from the boundaries, which define the voters in-
cluded or excluded, or in gerrymandering language, “packing and 
cracking.”179 Nevertheless, the majority concluded complacently 
that “[t]he First Amendment test simply describes the act of district-
ing for partisan advantage. It provides no standard for determining 
when partisan activity goes too far.”180 
The majority was similarly dismissive of the second prong of the 
First Amendment test, which involved the “actual burden” on vot-
ers.181 The majority concluded that “the slight anecdotal evidence 
found sufficient by the district courts in these cases shows that this 
too is not a serious standard for separating constitutional from un-
constitutional partisan gerrymandering.”182 
As for the third prong of the test, the causal link between the 
intent to burden particular voters and an actual burden found, the 
majority focused primarily on its critique of anecdotal evidence and 
examples, suggesting that this causal link requires very little evi-
dence of an actual burden.183 In an indirect reference to the causal 
link, the majority again invoked the idea of a “constitutional partisan 
gerrymander”184 as a phantom it has summoned from an apparently 
 
 176 Id. 
 177 See id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 See id. at 2513–14 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 180 Id. at 2504 (majority opinion). 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 2504–05. 
 184 See id. at 2504. 
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limitless reservoir of concepts that themselves have no grounding in 
the Constitution or election law statutes or regulations. The majority 
is simply attempting to create a phrase that it may hope it can trans-
form into a constitutional principle. In other words, the majority is 
simply making this up and telling us to believe it and act accord-
ingly. It is at times like this that the majority should remember that 
“the people” of the United States are sovereign and no institution of 
government is the source of sovereign authority. This is a remarka-
ble enterprise in a case that claims it is acting in the interest of judi-
cial restraint. 
3.  THE DISSENT’S TEST 
The majority had little to say with respect to the dissent’s test, 
and most of what it does say is dismissive.185 It begins with the idea 
that the criteria must be the same for all states during all time peri-
ods.186 This sudden appearance of uniformity is something of a sur-
prise, a tardily summoned rabbit emerging briefly from a handy hat. 
This is bolstered, if that is the word, by the observation that “[t]he 
degree of partisan advantage that the Constitution tolerates should 
not turn on criteria offered by the gerrymanderers themselves.”187 
Why not? Who would be a better source of insight into the intentions 
and expertise involved?  
The majority also claimed that the dissent’s test has no response 
to the question of how much is too much.188 However, the majority 
certainly does not refer to the entire response of the dissent, although 
it does seem to have time and space for a bit of gloating over what 
it interprets as the dissenters’ pique over what it sees as an unsatis-
factory response.189 But, at this point the majority seems to have de-
pleted its reserve of equanimity and has no substantive insights of 
its own to offer. The majority responded to the dissent’s answer—
“[t]his much is too much”190—by complaining “[t]hat is not even 
trying to articulate a standard or rule.”191 
 
 185 See id. at 2505–06. 
 186 Id. at 2505. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. (citing id. at 2521 (Kagan, J., dissenting)). 
 191 Id. 
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While the majority agreed with the dissent’s observation that 
matters of degree are left to the courts in other instances, it re-
sponded by trying to distinguish partisan gerrymandering from these 
other instances, stating: “[j]udges began with a significant body of 
law about what constituted a legal violation . . . . Here, on the other 
hand, the Constitution provides no basis whatever to guide the exer-
cise of judicial discretion.”192 The sleight of hand here again illumi-
nates the majority’s insistence that, in the case of partisan gerryman-
ders, the guidance must come from the Constitution,193 and that the 
guidance from the election law cases arising from Baker, which 
freed districting law from the political question doctrine, was not 
relevant. This, too, illustrates another strategy in the game plan. As 
it does throughout the opinion, the majority designs a series of nar-
rowly crafted boxes and then insists that no guidance from one small 
box has any relevance to the contents of any of the other small 
boxes. An opinion without reference to values is perfectly posi-
tioned to deny that there is no relevant guidance. 
The majority concludes its brief comments on the dissent’s test 
by pointing out that the only reference in the Constitution “that spe-
cifically addresses the matter assigns it to the political branches.”194 
It is entirely unclear what the majority is doing here. The language 
in Article I, Section 4, Clause l of the Constitution deals with elec-
tions for members of the House of Representatives and refers only 
to “Times, Places and Manner.”195 These issues are referred to the 
state legislatures, although Congress may intervene as it sees fit.196 
What is not made clear, although every member of the majority un-
doubtedly has a very clear understanding of this, is that areas of re-
sponsibility are not assigned to the judicial branch in the same way 
they are assigned to the legislative branch.197 Courts do not define 
their own agendas based on similar express allocations of authority. 
Instead, courts hear cases within their jurisdiction as defined in 
 
 192 Id. at 2506. 
 193 See id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 196 See Id. 
 197 Article I “enumerates” the powers of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Ar-
ticle II references three tasks of the Executive Branch as well as mentioning cer-
tain other duties and responsibilities. See U.S. CONST. art. II. 
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applicable federal law, including federal statutes.198 Such definitions 
of judicial jurisdiction are not limited to the terms of the Constitu-
tion because Congress has the power to statutorily create judicial 
jurisdiction through the “Laws of the United States” and the Court’s 
precedents further define judicial jurisdiction.199 Yet, in this case, 
the majority was not interested in expanding the applicable prece-
dents to include cases on voting rights or the conduct of elections.200 
  
4. VIOLATION OF THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE AND ELECTION BY 
THE PEOPLE IN THE NORTH CAROLINA CASE 
The North Carolina district court held that “the Elections Clause 
did not empower State legislatures to disfavor the interests of sup-
porters of a particular candidate or party in drawing congressional 
districts.”201 It also held that “partisan gerrymandering infringes the 
right of ‘the People’ to select their representatives.”202 The majority 
then asserted that this holding by the district court was inconsistent 
with the language in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Vi-
eth.203 At this point it would be useful to consider that a plurality 
opinion, like that in Vieth,204 is not necessarily binding precedent, 
and it, thus, arguably does not bind the North Carolina district 
court.205 The majority seems somewhat miffed that, in its words, 
“[t]he District Court nevertheless asserted that partisan gerryman-
ders violate ‘the core principle of [our] republican government’ pre-
served in Art. I, § 2, ‘namely, that the voters should choose their 
 
 198 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 199 See id.; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 200 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508. 
 201 Id. at 2506 (quoting Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 937 
(M.D.N.C. 2018)). 
 202 Id. (citing Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 938). 
 203 See id. 
 204 See id. at 2498. See generally Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285–86 
(2004) (plurality opinion). 
 205 See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a frag-
mented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys 
the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgements on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .’”(quoting Greg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))). 
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representatives, not the other way around.’”206 The majority’s game 
plan of subdividing precedents and concepts into slivers of reason-
ing confined to narrow boxes offers no possible response to this kind 
of reasoning. 
The Chief Justice responded by identifying another small box 
defined by the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4.207 This 
stratagem is perfectly consistent with the core purpose of the major-
ity opinion because “[the] Court has several times con-
cluded . . . that the Guarantee Clause does not provide the basis for 
a justiciable claim.”208 The majority offers no further insight into 
why the Guarantee Clause might be a more suitable and appropriate 
claim than the language in Article I.209 
B.  The Dissent Offers a Test Based on the Lower Courts’ 
Opinions 
The dissent seems perplexed by the majority opinion. In an ex-
tended section dealing with the lower courts’ development of tests 
of partisan gerrymanders and the dissent’s development of how to 
apply the lower courts’ approaches more broadly, the dissent begins 
by remarking: 
So the only way to understand the majority’s opinion 
is as follows: In the face of grievous harm to demo-
cratic governance and flagrant infringements on in-
dividuals’ rights—in the face of escalating partisan 
manipulation whose compatibility with this Nation’s 
values and law no one defends—the majority de-
clines to provide any remedy. For the first time in this 
Nation’s history, the majority declares that it can do 
nothing about an acknowledged constitutional viola-
tion because it has searched high and low and cannot 
find a workable legal standard to apply.210 
The dissent highlights the two problems identified by the majority. 
“First and foremost” is the lack of a neutral baseline from which to 
 
 206 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (citing Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 940)). 
 207 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 208 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (citing Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 940)). 
 209 See id. 
 210 Id. at 2515 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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measure injury.211 Because the plaintiffs want some form of propor-
tional representation, which is not required under the Constitution, 
the federal courts are left in the position of having to define political 
fairness.212 The second and “determinative” question is “[h]ow 
much is too much?” gerrymandering.213 Claiming that “no ‘discern-
ible and manageable’ standard is available,” the majority expresses 
a concern that “courts could willy-nilly become embroiled in fixing 
every districting plan.”214 
The dissent agreed that “[r]espect for state legislative pro-
cesses—and restraint in the exercise of judicial authority—counsels 
intervention in only egregious cases.”215 But the dissent insisted that 
the majority’s declaration of the impossibility of a constructive role 
for the judiciary was ill-advised and premature.216 It concluded that, 
in throwing up its hands, the majority misses some-
thing under its nose: What it says can’t be done has 
been done. Over the past several years, federal courts 
across the country—including, but not exclusively, 
in the decisions below—have largely converged on a 
standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering 
claims (striking down both Democratic and Republi-
can districting plans in the process) . . . . The stand-
ard does not use any judge-made conception of elec-
toral fairness—either proportional representation or 
any other; instead, it takes as its baseline a State’s 
own criteria of fairness, apart from partisan gain. And 
by requiring plaintiffs to make difficult showings re-
lating to both purpose and effects, the standard inval-
idates the most extreme, but only the most extreme, 
partisan gerrymanders.217 
 
 211 Id. 
 212 See id. at 2499–500 (majority opinion). 
 213 Id. at 2515 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 2516. 
 216 See id. 
 217 Id. The dissent references three district court opinions, each of which was 
struck down by the Supreme Court. Id. 
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The dissent stated that the majority’s critiques of the lower courts’ 
approaches revealed “a saddening nonchalance about the threat such 
districting poses to self-governance.”218 The dissent rejected the ma-
jority’s view that “judicial policing in this area cannot be either neu-
tral or restrained” and concluded that “[t]he lower courts’ reason-
ing . . . proves the opposite.”219 
1.  A STANDARD CRAFTED BY THE LOWER COURTS 
The dissent began by suggesting, indirectly but forcefully, that 
the majority could not see or understand the standard developed by 
the lower courts because it chose not to see it.220 It claimed that the 
majority disregarded the common features of the lower courts’ test 
because it “disaggregates the opinions below, distinguishing the one 
from the other and then chopping up each into ‘a number of 
“tests.”’”221 The dissent accused the majority of deliberately mis-
reading the lower court cases and deliberately misinterpreting these 
approaches to develop a common standard.222 
The dissent explained that both of the lower courts focused on 
“the harm of vote dilution,” which the North Carolina court ana-
lyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Maryland court an-
alyzed under the First Amendment.223 The dissent then asserted that 
the lower courts used “basically the same three-part test” based on 
intent, effects, and causation to determine whether plaintiffs had 
made out a vote dilution claim.224 This vote dilution claim required 
showing that state officials’ “predominant purpose” was to “‘en-
trench [their party] in power’ by diluting the votes of citizens favor-
ing its rival.”225 In addition, the plaintiffs must establish that the ger-
rymandering efforts have diluted their votes “‘substantially.’”226 If 
the plaintiffs make these showings of “predominant purpose” and 
 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
 220 See id. at 2515–16. 
 221 Id. at 2516. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. (quoting Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 864 
(M.D.N.C. 2018) (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 791 (2015))). 
 226 Id. (quoting Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 498 (D. Md. 2018)). 
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“substantial[]” vote dilution, then the State must offer a “legitimate, 
non-partisan justification to save its map.”227 
The dissent then concluded that the test developed by the lower 
courts looks “utterly ordinary,” at least to lawyers, and that “[i]t is 
the sort of thing courts work with every day.”228 Justice Kagan chal-
lenged the idea that the task at hand exceeded the judicial compe-
tence of the federal courts and thus rejected the majority’s holding 
that partisan gerrymandering cases are nonjusticiable.229 
The dissent offered both a detailed analysis of the application of 
this standard to North Carolina and Maryland and challenged the 
critique of these cases by the majority. In both cases, state officials 
openly declared partisan purposes for the maps that were drawn at 
their direction and under their supervision.230 To the dissent, these 
unabashed public statements satisfied the “predominant purpose” 
prong of the test of a partisan gerrymander.231 It then stated that it 
found the majority’s remarks about the purpose analysis “discom-
forting.”232 It was not a disagreement over the lower courts’ findings 
but an assertion that “state officials’ intent to entrench their party in 
power is perfectly ‘permissible,’ even when it is the predominant 
factor in drawing district lines.”233 The dissent stated bluntly and 
unequivocally: “But that is wrong.”234 The dissent explained that it 
may be true in some instances, such as “when state officials used 
political data to ensure rough proportional representation between 
the two parties,”235 and “true enough that even the naked purpose to 
gain partisan advantage may not rise to the level of constitutional 
notice when it is not the driving force in mapmaking or when the 
 
 227 Id. (citing Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 867). “Neither North Carolina nor 
Maryland offered much of an alternative explanation for the evidence that the 
plaintiffs put forward. Presumably, both States had trouble coming up with some-
thing. Like the majority . . . I therefore pass quickly over this part of the test.” Id. 
at 2516 n.2. 
 228 Id. at 2516–17. 
 229 Id. at 2519–20. 
 230 Id. at 2517. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 738 (1973)). 
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intended gain is slight.”236 The dissent distinguished these two situ-
ations from the situation in the court below, explaining, “[b]ut when 
political actors have a specific and predominant intent to entrench 
themselves in power by manipulating district lines, that goes too 
far.”237 The dissent then addressed the cases before the Court di-
rectly: “But why even bother with hypotheticals? Just consider the 
purposes here. It cannot be permissible and thus irrelevant, as the 
majority claims, that state officials have as their purpose the kind of 
grotesquely gerrymandered map that, according to all this Court has 
ever said, violates the Constitution.”238 
The dissent then addressed the consequences of the activity, fo-
cusing in particular on whether it substantially diluted the plaintiffs’ 
votes.239 The dissent noted that the majority had not focused on the 
“evidence the District Courts relied on” and then noted that the evi-
dence, particularly from North Carolina, “is the key to understand-
ing both the problem these cases present and the solution to it they 
offer.”240 The dissent explained the importance of this evidence as 
follows: “The evidence reveals just how bad the two gerrymanders 
were (in case you had any doubts). And it shows how the same tech-
nologies and data that today facilitate extreme partisan gerryman-
ders also enable courts to discover them, by exposing just how much 
they dilute votes.”241 The approach, labelled the “extreme outlier ap-
proach,” used advanced computer technology “to randomly gener-
ate a large collection of districting plans” that reflected a state’s ge-
ographical and political geography and meet its declared districting 
criteria, except for partisan gain.242 The computer program then used 
actual precinct-level votes from past elections to determine a parti-
san outcome.243 Justice Kagan explained how the resulting maps can 
be used to find and cure partisan gerrymanders by creating a contin-
uum of, for example, one thousand maps, ranging from maps most 
 
 236 Id. (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285–86 (2004) (plurality opin-
ion)). 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 312–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (noting that 
Justice Kennedy predicted this development ). 
 242 Id. at 2517–18. 
 243 Id. at 2518. 
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favorable to Republicans to maps most favorable to Democrats.244 
This allows a court to identify the “median outcome” and compare 
it to the maps at each tail of the continuum, which are maps repre-
senting partisan extremes and the most significant vote dilution.245 
Using this approach showed that the North Carolina map generated 
by the State “was an out-out-out-outlier.”246 The dissent concluded 
that 
this distribution of outcomes provides what the ma-
jority says does not exist—a neutral comparator for 
the State’s own plan . . . . It essentially answers the 
question: In a State with these geographic features 
and this distribution of voters and this set of district-
ing criteria—but without partisan manipulation—
what would happen?247 
Maryland involved only one district requiring “only a minimal 
change,” but the “Democratic officials reconfigured the entire dis-
trict.”248 The Maryland district court found that “the gerrymandered 
Maryland map substantially dilute[d] Republicans’ votes.”249 
Noting that the majority dismissed these findings as “‘prognos-
tications’ about the future, in which no one ‘can have any confi-
dence,’” the dissent responded with a ringing endorsement of the 
methods used by the two federal district courts and an unmistakable 
repudiation of the majority’s reasoning.250 The dissent concluded: 
But the courts below did not gaze into crystal balls, 
as the majority tries to suggest. Their findings about 
these gerrymanders’ effects on voters—both in the 
past and predictably in the future—were evidence-
based, data-based, statistics-based. Knowledge-
based, one might say. The courts did what anyone 
 
 244 Id. 
 245 See id. (citing Brief for amicus curiae Eric S. Lander in Support of Appel-
lees at 7–22, Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (No. 18-422)). 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. n.3. 
 248 Id. at 2518–19. 
 249 Id. (citing Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 519–20 (D. Md. 
2018)). 
 250 Id. at 2519. 
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would want a decisionmaker to do when so much 
hangs in the balance. They looked hard at the facts, 
and they went where the facts led them . . . . They 
looked at the evidence—at the facts about how these 
districts operated—and they could reach only one 
conclusion. By substantially diluting the votes of cit-
izens favoring their rivals, the politicians of one party 
had succeeded in entrenching themselves in office. 
They had beat democracy.251 
This summation of the methodological challenges posed by the par-
tisan gerrymander cases and the resourcefulness of the lower federal 
courts in addressing these challenges also served as a harsh rebuke 
of the majority opinion. There was more to come as the dissent de-
tailed its objections to the majority’s claim that judicial oversight of 
partisan gerrymandering cases would not be either “politically neu-
tral” or “manageable.”252 
The dissent was unpersuaded by and somewhat offended at what 
seems to have been portrayed as a lack of effort and engagement by 
the majority. The dissent found that the majority “never tries to an-
alyze the serious question presented here—whether the kind of 
standard developed below falls prey to those objections, or instead 
allows for neutral and manageable oversight.”253 The dissent an-
swered its own question with the observation that judicial oversight 
“is not only possible; it’s been done.”254 It then applies this insight 
to both neutrality and manageability. 
2. JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY 
The dissent pointed out that the district court never had to ad-
dress issues of fairness because it never had to “choose among com-
peting visions of electoral fairness.”255 The lower courts “did not try 
to compare the State’s actual map to an ‘ideally fair’ one” but 
“[i]nstead, they looked at the difference between what the State did 
 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. at 2520. The dissent illustrated this characterization of the majority 
opinion by noting: “To prove its point, the majority throws a bevy of question 
marks on the page. (I count nine in just two paragraphs . . . ).” Id. at 2519–20. 
 254 Id. at 2520. 
 255 Id. 
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and what the State would have done if politicians hadn’t been intent 
on partisan gain.”256 Rather, “the courts’ analyses used the State’s 
own criteria for electoral fairness—except for naked partisan 
gain.”257 
In the case of North Carolina, all the maps took account of the 
“State’s districting priorities” as well as its “political” and “legal 
landscape.”258 The dissent explained that: 
The point is that the assemblage of maps, reflecting 
the characteristics and judgments of the State itself, 
creates a neutral baseline from which to assess 
whether partisanship has run amok. Extreme outlier 
as to what? As to the other maps the State could have 
produced given its unique political geography and its 
chosen districting criteria. Not as to the maps a judge, 
with his own view of electoral fairness, could have 
dreamed up.259 
The same process occurred in Maryland, where, again, the district 
court “analyzed the gerrymander’s effects in much the same way—
not as against an ideal goal, but as against an ex ante baseline.”260 
The dissent concluded that in the Maryland case, 
[t]he court did not strike down the new Sixth District 
because a judicial ideal of proportional representa-
tion commanded another Republican seat. It invali-
dated that district because the quest for partisan gain 
made the State override its own political geography 
and districting criteria. So much, then, for the impos-
sibility of neutrality.261 
As discussed above, the majority simply remarked that this 
“does not make sense” because the criteria will vary over time.262 
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The dissent is having none of this concern about change over time, 
responding crisply: 
But that is a virtue, not a vice—a feature, not a bug. 
Using the criteria the State itself has chosen at the 
relevant time prevents any judicial predilections 
from affecting the analysis—exactly what the major-
ity claims it wants. At the same time, using those cri-
teria enables a court to measure just what it should: 
the extent to which the pursuit of partisan ad-
vantage—by these legislators at this moment—has 
distorted the State’s districting decisions.263 
The dissent took this as yet another opportunity to point out that the 
majority does not understand the facts or the applicable law in these 
two cases.264 It pointed out that “the majority’s analysis falters be-
cause it equates the demand to eliminate partisan gerrymandering 
with a demand for a single partisan distribution—the one reflecting 
proportional representation.”265 The dissent concluded that those 
two demands are not the same and only partisan gerrymandering is 
at issue in this case.266 
3. HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH? 
As discussed above, the majority insisted that a court could not 
determine how much partisanship is too much.267 The dissent had 
little patience for this reasoning. It pointed to the two cases before 
the Court and asked: “How about the following for a first-cut an-
swer: This much is too much.”268 The majority had dismissed this 
response as “not . . . serious.”269 The majority perhaps did not fully 
appreciate the implications of its dismissal of the dissent’s standard 
and its application as “not serious.” The dissent explained: 
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By any measure, a map that produces a greater parti-
san skew than any of 3,000 randomly generated maps 
(all with the State’s political geography and district-
ing criteria built in) reflects “too much” partisan-
ship . . . . The absolute worst of 3,001 possible maps. 
The only one that could produce a 10–3 partisan split 
even as Republicans got a bare majority of the 
statewide vote. And again: How much is too much? 
This much is too much . . . . A map that in 2011 was 
responsible for the largest partisan swing of a con-
gressional district in the country . . . . If the majority 
had done nothing else, it could have set the line here. 
How much is too much? At the least, any gerryman-
ders as bad as these.270 
Alternatively, the dissent suggested that the majority could have fo-
cused on the “‘predominant’ purpose and ‘substantial’ effects.”271 
The dissent noted: “Although purpose inquiries carry certain haz-
ards (which courts must attend to), they are a common form of anal-
ysis in constitutional cases.”272 The dissent concluded that purpose 
analysis “would be no harder here than in other contexts.”273 
The dissent was similarly pointed in its dismissal of the idea that 
courts cannot determine whether a particular district map “‘substan-
tially’ dilutes the votes of a rival party’s supporters” from the base-
line described by the dissent.274 As the dissent noted, courts make 
such determinations “all the time.”275 The dissent observed that, 
“[i]f courts are no longer competent to do so, they will have to re-
linquish, well, substantial portions of their docket.”276 The dissent 
pointed out, in this case, “[t]hat the two courts below found consti-
tutional violations does not mean their tests were unrigorous; it 
means that the conduct they confronted was constitutionally appal-
ling—by even the strictest measure, inordinately partisan.”277 
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In a general condemnation of the majority’s opinion, the dissent 
concluded: 
The majority, in the end, fails to understand both the 
plaintiffs’ claims and the decisions below. Every-
thing in today’s opinion assumes that these cases 
grew out of a “desire for proportional representation” 
or, more generally phrased, a “fair share of political 
power.” . . . And everything in it assumes that the 
courts below had to (and did) decide what that fair 
share would be. But that is not so . . . . The plaintiffs 
asked only that the courts bar politicians from en-
trenching themselves in power by diluting the votes 
of their rivals’ supporters. And the courts, using neu-
tral and manageable—and eminently legal—stand-
ards, provided that (and only that) relief. This Court 
should have cheered, not overturned, that restoration 
of the people’s power to vote.278 
The majority did not cheer. It accomplished, at least for a moment 
or two in judicial history, what the plurality in Vieth failed to ac-
complish279—it achieved a 5–4 majority for treating partisan gerry-
manders as nonjusticiable political questions not subject to judicial 
review. The Court had been led out of the political thicket by a will-
ful, skillful, and crafty Chief Justice. But where did Chief Justice 
Roberts lead the Court and where did he leave the law? 
IV. A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT: CONSIDERING HOW 
RUCHO ENDED 
Rucho ended with the unobtrusively radical outcome that the be-
ginning foreshadowed. It ended as every tragedy ends—in an inex-
orable place that had been the whole purpose of the enterprise. 
Rucho ends by choosing to remove the Court from its constitutional 
duty to ensure that the people choose their representatives and that 
these representatives do not become rulers who are able to choose 
their own voters. Trying to explain why the majority did this is 
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beyond the scope of this Article. The reason for doing it matters less 
than the fact that the majority did it. Chief Justice Roberts used his 
estimable skills as an advocate to devise ways to discuss partisan 
gerrymanders without discussing voters or voting, and to discuss the 
dangers he might have feared would befall courts without discussing 
the appropriate role of the courts. He invoked the Constitution with-
out discussing the constitutional values at stake in this case. He man-
aged to discuss partisan gerrymanders from a bygone era without 
acknowledging the far greater precision that modern technology and 
contemporary databases make possible and without ever acknowl-
edging the constitutional harm that results from the changing cir-
cumstances. Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion about standards 
unrelated to behavior or consequences and constitutional values. 
Chief Justice Roberts cannot claim that he did not know what he 
was doing. He clearly knew exactly what he was doing. The final 
section of his opinion begins with the observation: “Excessive par-
tisanship in districting leads to results that reasonably seem un-
just.”280 This dizzying mixture of defensiveness and condescension 
was followed by Chief Justice Roberts quoting Arizona State Legis-
lature v. Independent Redistricting Commission, saying that such 
gerrymandering is “incompatible with democratic principles.”281 
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts then announced that this con-
clusion “does not mean that the solution lies with the federal judici-
ary.”282 What problem is he discussing? Not the voting rights of 
American citizens, which remains nowhere to be found in the ma-
jority’s reasoning. Instead of the rights of voters, the majority in-
sisted that “[f]ederal judges have no license to reallocate political 
power between the two major political parties, with no plausible 
grant of authority in the Constitution, and no legal standards to limit 
and direct their decisions.”283 The Chief Justice then castigated the 
appellees and the dissent—the appellees apparently for seeking jus-
tice and the dissent for its reading of the Constitution.284 The Chief 
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Justice, who found no harm in partisan gerrymanders, catalogued 
the harms arising from any view but his own in this case: 
What the appellees and dissent seek is an unprece-
dented expansion of judicial power. We have never 
struck down a partisan gerrymander as unconstitu-
tional—despite various requests over the past 45 
years. The expansion of judicial authority would not 
be into just any area of controversy, but into one of 
the most intensely partisan aspects of American po-
litical life. That intervention would be unlimited in 
scope and duration—it would recur over and over 
again around the country with each new round of dis-
tricting, for state as well as federal representatives. 
Consideration of the impact of today’s ruling on 
democratic principles cannot ignore the effect of the 
unelected and politically unaccountable branch of 
the Federal Government assuming such an extraordi-
nary and unprecedented role.285 
This brief reference to the burden on the federal courts and the fleet-
ing reference to harms arising from any attempt to address these bur-
dens is the only rationale for this extraordinary opinion. The voters 
and the role of voting remain unaddressed. Indeed, to have ad-
dressed such issues would have been to admit their importance, and 
this, in turn, would have raised inconvenient questions about access 
to justice. 
At this point, the majority’s search for a rationale for their entire 
approach gave way to a self-protective defensiveness. The majority 
asserted: “Our conclusion does not condone excessive partisan ger-
rymandering. Nor does our conclusion condemn complaints about 
districting to echo into a void.”286 What follows is a remarkable cat-
alogue of options that have not proved successful by actors other 
than the federal judiciary.287 Certain of these options depend on 
strategies that the tactically narrow focus of the majority opinion had 
not considered when analyzing the role of the federal courts, while 
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some have been recognized as exercises in political futility from the 
beginning. The majority suggested that the states should address 
partisan gerrymanders through legislation, by establishing inde-
pendent commissions, by appointing a state demographer, or by pro-
hibiting actions taken for the purpose of partisan advantage.288 
The majority, having failed to discuss the long line of districting 
cases decided by the federal courts in response to Baker, stated ap-
provingly that some states “have mandated at least some of the tra-
ditional districting criteria for their mapmakers,” something that the 
majority found did not apply to federal action relating to partisan 
gerrymanders.289 The majority pointed to actions taken by state 
courts and suggested that the state courts benefit from more focused 
legislation than that available to the federal courts, observing that 
“[p]rovisions in state statutes and state constitutions can provide 
standards and guidance for state courts to apply.”290 The majority 
also noted that the Constitution gave Congress authority to amend 
actions taken by states and listed several bills that have never at-
tracted strong support in Congress.291 Indeed, the majority took the 
position that “the Framers gave Congress the power to do something 
about partisan gerrymandering in the Elections Clause.”292 But, the 
majority never admitted that this admission strongly suggests that 
the broad power of judicial review provides constitutional support 
for the federal courts to play their traditional role in this area just as 
they did in other voting rights matters. From this perspective, the 
majority’s final defense of what it had done lacks persuasive power. 
The majority insists that “[n]o one can accuse this Court of having 
a crabbed view of the reach of its competence.”293 That is exactly 
the point. Why did a Court that does not have a crabbed view of the 
reach of its competence as a general matter write an opinion based 
on a crabbed view of its competence in dealing with partisan gerry-
manders? The question that remains unanswered is why the majority 
insisted that it had no authority to pursue justice in a matter at the 
core of the constitutional system. 
 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. at 2507. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. at 2508. 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id. 
506 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:459 
 
The dissent ended where it had begun, with its reasoning firmly 
grounded in constitutional values. But the dissent proved to be de-
cidedly more practical than the majority about locating these foun-
dational values in contemporary controversies and devising solu-
tions that, while far from perfect, were designed to be far better than 
abdication or any other operational approach to the challenge of 
high-tech, big data partisan gerrymanders.294 The dissent understood 
in ways that the majority refused to admit that the elected politicians 
in the executive and legislative branches would prioritize their own 
careers over the future of the republic. The dissent understood that 
Benjamin Franklin was speaking in practical terms when he de-
scribed the new government as “a republic[,] if you can keep it.”295 
The dissent also understood that “keeping” the republic would al-
ways require the active support of the judicial branch, observing 
that, 
This Court has long understood that it has a special 
responsibility to remedy violations of constitutional 
rights resulting from politicians’ districting deci-
sions[,] . . . recognizing as we established the one-
person-one-vote rule that “our oath and our office re-
quire no less.” . . . Of course, our oath and our office 
require us to vindicate all constitutional rights. But 
the need for judicial review is at its most urgent in 
cases like these. “For here, politicians’ incentives 
conflict with voters’ interests, leaving citizens with-
out any political remedy for their constitutional 
harms.” . . . Those harms arise because politicians 
want to stay in office. No one can look to them for 
effective relief.296 
The dissent then made short work of the various reform oppor-
tunities the majority belatedly discovered. Noting that the majority 
highlighted a list of bills that had, over the years, been filed in Con-
gress, the dissent observed that “what all these bills have in common 
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is that they are not laws.”297 The dissent found the Chief Justice’s 
comments on state courts “perplexing,” leading it to ask, “what do 
those courts know that this Court does not?”298 The dissent con-
cluded that “[w]e could have, and we should have” done what the 
lower courts had already done.299 The dissent then at some length 
detailed the contributions made by the lower federal courts.300 The 
dissent concluded with a note of disappointment at what it regarded 
as a failure by the Court, observing: 
Of all times to abandon the Court’s duty to declare 
the law, this was not the one. The practices chal-
lenged in these cases imperil our system of govern-
ment. Part of the Court’s role in that system is to de-
fend its foundations. None is more important than 
free and fair elections.301 
Then, Justice Kagan signed her opinion: “With respect but deep sad-
ness, I dissent.”302 
CONCLUSION 
It is far from clear that the majority opinion can or will survive 
to shape the law in this area. Its very reliance on the strategic and 
tactical stratagems of its framework and its game plan are also a 
source of potential vulnerability in future cases challenging the 
treatment of partisan gerrymanders as political questions. As more 
lawyers and judges develop greater understanding of the mechan-
isms of modern gerrymandering technology, the day is likely to 
come—perhaps sooner rather than later—that a majority can be 
found among justices who understand the technology and have the 
will to address the harms of partisan gerrymandering. Until that 
time, the majority opinion will deny access to justice to the individ-
ual voters who are harmed and, thereby, undermine democracy. In 
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an era of politicians who accept no boundaries, courts that accept no 
responsibilities are a misfortune for democracy. 
